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ABSTRACT
Conditional and directed deceased organ donations occur when donors (or
often their next of kin) attempt to influence the allocation of their donated
organs. This can include asking that the organs are given to or withheld
from certain types of people, or that they are given to specified individuals.
Donations of these types have raised ethical concerns, and have been
prohibited in many countries, including the UK. In this article we report the
findings from a qualitative study involving interviews with potential donors
(n = 20), potential recipients (n = 9) and transplant staff (n = 11), and use
these results as a springboard for further ethical commentary.
We argue that although participants favoured unconditional donation,
this preference was grounded in a false distinction between ‘medical’ and
‘non-medical’ allocation criteria. Although there are good reasons to main-
tain organ allocation based primarily upon the existing ‘medical’ criteria, it
may be premature to reject all other potential criteria as being unaccepta-
ble. Part of participants’ justification for allocating organs using ‘medical’
criteria was to make the best use of available organs and avoid wasting
their potential benefit, but this can also justify accepting conditional dona-
tions in some circumstances. We draw a distinction between two types of
waste – absolute and relative – and argue that accepting conditional dona-
tions may offer a balance between these forms of waste.
BACKGROUND
Organ donation worldwide has failed to meet demand for
organs, and despite attempts to increase donation rates,
this seems set to continue. Patients have to wait for
organs to become available for transplant and many die
before they are offered a suitable organ.1 Nonetheless,
some offered organs are rejected onmoral grounds. In the
UK, this has included conditional donations and some
directed donations. Directed deceased donations occur
when a deceased person (or frequently their next-of-kin)
agrees to donate organs only if they are allocated to a
specific recipient. Conditional deceased donations occur
when a person agrees to donate organs on the condition
that they are allocated to (or withheld from) a specific
type of recipient. 2
A conditional donation occurred in the UK in 1998
when a white man’s next-of-kin specified that his organs
could not be allocated to non-whites. The organs were
accepted and allocated to white people (who, by coinci-
dence, would have been the recipients regardless of the
restrictions), and several lives were saved/improved.
Accepting this donation was controversial and prompted
1 NHS Blood and Transplant. 2014. Organ Donation and Transplanta-
tion Activity Figures. [cited 2015 Feb 5] Available from: http://
nhsbtmediaservices.blob.core.windows.net/organ-donation-assets/
pdfs/annual_stats.pdf [cited 2015 Feb 5].
2 A.J. Cronin & D. Price, Directed Organ Donation: Is the Donor the
Owner?, Clinical Ethics 2008; 3: 127–131.
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criticism in the British media.3 A Department of Health
(DH) investigation concluded that all conditional
deceased donation should be prohibited4 (this also
included directed donations) and this was the position in
the UK until 2010 when policy5 was introduced to distin-
guish between conditional donation and ‘requests for
directed allocation’.6
The new policy permits requests for directed donation
to recipients in ‘qualifying relationships’ (family members
or close friends) to be considered, provided that:
i) the agreement to donate is not conditional on the
request being granted;
ii) granting the request would not deprive a ‘super-
urgent’ recipient of a transplant.
A request for directed donation, unlike conditional
donation, identifies a specific recipient rather than a type
of person. Although this policy change raised issues
which have been discussed elsewhere,7 it harmonized poli-
cies for deceased and living donation, where directed
donation to family members or friends is commonplace.
Outside the UK, there are different approaches to con-
ditional and directed donations. In the US, for example,
an organization called LifeSharers allows people to reg-
ister as donors and request that their organs are first
offered to members of LifeSharers.8 Donation is not con-
ditional on the request being granted, so is similar to a
request for directed donation. Where it differs, however,
is that potential recipients are prioritized by the donor
not based on a pre-existing relationship, but instead
because they are both members of the same ‘club’.
Conditional donation and directed donation both
attempt to introduce criteria into deceased organ alloca-
tion that are normally excluded. Organs from deceased
donors are normally allocated according to criteria that
reflect tissue matching, urgency and waiting time, and the
DH report objected to conditional donations on the
grounds that they prevent organs being allocated accord-
ing to such established criteria.9
The types of conditions commonly considered in
existing literature tend to be the most obviously contro-
versial, such as those based upon race, religion or
reason for illness, but it may be mistaken to therefore
assume that all conditions are unacceptable.10 Refusing
to accept donations with conditions attached continues
to generate controversy. Although there are relatively
few requests for conditional donation, the impact on
donation rates of discouraging conditional donation is
unclear. Some of the ethical and legal aspects of condi-
tional donation have already received attention,11 and
the DH 2000 report has been subject to criticism: the
resulting incongruity created between living and
deceased donations has been noted, for instance.12 There
is also literature on public preferences about organ allo-
cation more generally, which covers some of the poten-
tial allocation options that could form the basis for
conditions.13 Some research has been conducted on
public views on conditional donation,14 but there is a
lack of in-depth research looking not just at the views of
key stakeholders, but also the justifications for these
views. This article reports the findings of a qualitative
study that explored conditional and directed donation
with key stakeholders, and used the resulting data to
inform a critical commentary on the ethical issues. The
qualitative study was designed primarily to obtain data
that could act as a springboard for further critical
analysis, based on the premise that systematic interac-
tions with stakeholders can help ensure the theorist is
exposed to additional arguments and perspectives,
leading to a thorough, nuanced and contextually aware
ethical analysis; a process sometimes referred to as
empirical bioethics.15
3 BBC News, 2000. Racist Organ Donation Condemned. [cited 2015 Feb
5] Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/652132.stm.
4 Department of Health. 2000. An Investigation into Conditional Organ
Donation. [cited 2015 Feb 5] Available from: http://webarchive
.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/
prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/
digitalasset/dh_4035465.pdf.
5 NHS Blood and Transplant. 2010. Requested Allocation of a Deceased
Donor Organ. [cited 2015 Feb 5] Available from: www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/
to2020/resources/finalguidanceen.doc.
6 Although the new policy uses the term ‘requests for directed alloca-
tion’, the term ‘request for directed donation’ will be used throughout
this article to avoid confusion.
7 J.F. Douglas & A.J. Cronin. Requested Allocation of a Deceased
Donor Organ: Laws and Misconceptions. J Med Ethics 2010; 36: 321.
8 Lifesharers, 2015. Lifesharers Homepage. [cited 2015 March 9] Avail-
able from: http://www.lifesharers.org.
9 Department of Health. op. cit. note 4.
10 D. Price. Conditional Organ Donation – A View of the Ethicist,
Transplantation 2008; 85: 1540–1541.
11 T.M. Wilkinson. Racist Organ Donors and Saving Lives, Bioethics
2007; 21: 63–74; G. Pennings. Directed Organ Donation: Discrimina-
tion or Autonomy? J Appl Philos 2007; 24: 41–49; R.M. Veatch. Trans-
plantation Ethics. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press;
2000; A.J. Cronin & J.F. Douglas. Directed and Conditional Deceased
Donor Organ Donations: Laws and Misconceptions. Med Law Rev
2010; 18: 275–301; Cronin & Price. op. cit. note 2.
12 Cronin & Douglas. op. cit. note 11.
13 C.J. Browning & S.A. Thomas. Community Values and Preferences
in Transplantation Organ Allocation Decisions. Social Science and
Medicine 2001; 52: 853–861.
14 J. Neuberger &D.Mayer. Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of
the UK General Public Findings of an Ipsos-Mori Poll’. Transplanta-
tion 2008; 85: 1545–1547.
15 J. Ives & H. Draper. Appropriate methodologies for empirical bio-
ethics: it’s all relative. Bioethics 2009; 23: 249–258.
Greg Moorlock, Jonathan Ives, Simon Bramhall, and Heather Draper2
© 2015 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Should We Reject Donated Organs on Moral Grounds? 283
VC 2015 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
METHODS
Semi-structured interviews were used, as these allow for
in-depth discussion with scope for probing and discussion
on related issues. The interviews focussed on not just
participants’ beliefs, but also the arguments and justifi-
cations, as these were likely to provide useful data for
informing philosophical reflections. A scenario-based
topic guide was used (see Table 1), comprising three sce-
narios and follow-up questions. The scenarios, designed
to exemplify some of the issues arising from conditional
donations, focussed on desert, religious belief and immi-
gration status.16 Scenarios were used to facilitate discus-
sion because they allow participants, who are likely to be
less comfortable or practised in articulating thoughts
about abstract ethical principles and justifications, to
begin to think about complex issues. They act as a start-
ing point to generate discussion. When the discussion is
initially focussed on concrete examples the participants
can begin to articulate their thoughts in context, which
then allows the interviewer to probe and explore other
types of conditions and to explore underlying values and
justification. Starting from a discussion of the ‘concrete’,
and then using that to explore the ‘abstract’ is a more
effective method then starting with discussion of abstract
principles and justifications – and is a method that has
been used to good effect elsewhere.17
Forty participants were recruited from three stake-
holder groups: transplant staff, potential organ recipients
and potential organ donors. Staff participants were
recruited from the liver and kidney units of a large UK
transplant centre. Staff with a range of transplant roles
were recruited (see Table 2). Potential organ recipients
were defined as patients on a transplant waiting list or
who were likely to be listed in the foreseeable future. All
were patients at the same UK transplant centre. The
16 The scenarios were not built around the conditions already fre-
quently discussed in the literature, such as conditional donation exclud-
ing alcoholics, due to concerns about the impact that this may have on
participants from the recipient group whose health conditions were
associated with their previous lifestyle choices. At the same time, the
scenarios needed to be sufficiently controversial to generate discussion
of the rights and wrongs of imposing conditions. It was therefore
decided to frame the scenarios in more general terms to avoid distress-
ing participants. The local research ethics committee requested that the
scenarios were made even more general e.g. not to make reference to
any specific religion.
17 See, for example: J. Ives, H. Draper, H. Pattison & C. CWilliams.
Becoming a father/refusing fatherhood: An empirical bioethics
approach to paternal responsibilities and rights. Clin Ethics 2008; 3:
75–84.
Table 1. Interview Scenarios
Generic Scenario Number 1
Two young men are killed in a car accident. The driver was driving recklessly and above the speed limit, which caused him to lose control of his
car and crash, killing both himself and his passenger. The parents of the passenger are very distressed that their son was killed by someone
acting so recklessly and are angry and upset that two lives have, in their eyes, been wasted.
The parents of the passenger are very keen that their son’s organs should be donated, but they have concerns about the sort of person that his
organs might be transplanted to. They would like their son’s organs to be transplanted to people who will look after them and live responsibly,
and they consider young people to be risk-takers who are less likely to act responsibly than slightly older people with families. They therefore
request that their son’s organs are only transplanted to people who are over the age of 25 and have children. In the parents’ opinion, these are
likely to be responsible people who will look after themselves and deserve the improvements to quality of life that an organ transplant can bring.
Staff at the hospital tell the parents that they are not allowed to say who their son’s organs will go to, and that decisions like this are made by
medical staff on the basis of medical considerations. If the organ donation is to go ahead, the organs must be donated without any restrictions
being placed on who the organs can be transplanted to.
The parents decide that because of the chance that their son’s organs will go to people who they consider don’t deserve them, they won’t give
permission for their son’s organs to be donated.
Generic Scenario Number 2
A young woman dies following an accident. All of her organs are suitable for transplantation. This woman’s faith and religious beliefs shaped how
she chose to lead her life, and she placed great value in being what she considered a good member of her religion. Her parents know that her
religious beliefs were very important to her, and are confident that, given a choice, she would have preferred for her organs to go to another
member of her religion. Her parents therefore give consent for their daughter’s organs to be donated, but request that priority is given to
members of their daughter’s religion. This request is not motivated by any dislike for a particular group of people; it is made simply because the
parents believe that their daughter would prefer for her organs to go to people with similar beliefs and values to her own.
The hospital staff explain that these sorts of requests cannot be complied with under existing policy, which states that organs will be given to the
people who are in greatest need and who are the best match.
Generic Scenario Number 3
A man has died in an accident. All of his organs are suitable for donation, and his family are very keen that his organs should be donated. Prior
to his death, the man had expressed concerns about the number of immigrants that had moved to his area. He believed that a lot of the
immigrants were taking jobs, benefits and resources that would otherwise be given to local people. He believed that people like himself who have
lived in the area all of their lives should have everything that they need before things are given away to people who have arrived from other
countries.
The man had made clear, prior to his death, that if he died he wanted to donate his organs, but that he didn’t want his organs to be transplanted
to immigrants. Knowing that their relative held these views, the next-of-kin agree to donation only if the organs do not go to immigrants.
Staff at the hospital tell the next-of-kin that they are not allowed to say who the organs should or should not go to, and that if the organs are
going to be donated they have to be donated to the general pool. The family insist that they will not agree to donate the man’s organs if there is
a risk of them going to immigrants, as the deceased man would have been opposed to this.
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potential donor category included members of the
healthy general population, since anyone can potentially
donate organs. Because South Asian (SA) donation rates
in the UK are relatively low,18 we were interested to
explore the idea that conditional donation has potential
to increase organ donation in the local SA population.
Accordingly, we attempted to ensure that our sample of
potential donors comprised a good proportion of SA
participants (up to half), to increase the possibility that
we might learn something about this.
Each participant gave written informed consent before
their interview, and each interview was audio-recorded
and transcribed verbatim. A favourable opinion was
given by an NHS research ethics committee (Ref.
10/H1208/34) and the University of Birmingham research
ethics committee (Ref. ERN_10-0900), and appropriate
R&D permissions were obtained.
The interviews were analysed by Moorlock using
NVivo software. ‘Initial Coding’ as described by
Saldana19 was undertaken using a relatively open-ended
approach. As more codes were introduced, these were
sorted into themes. Data were coded, and themes devel-
oped, with a view to identifying reasons for and against
conditional and directed donation (both practical and
theoretical), which is in keeping with the aim of the
empirical research being to expose the theorist to addi-
tional arguments and perspectives. The codes and themes
developed as the project progressed, and earlier tran-
scripts were re-examined to check for instances of newer
codes. A sample of transcripts was independently coded
by Draper and Ives to check consistency of coding and to
try to minimize researcher bias.
RESULTS
The collected data was rich and covered many ethical
issues arising from conditional donation. The results pre-
sented here are underpinned by a common theme: the use
of medical criteria to allocate organs. Some interpreta-
tion is included alongside the narrative of the results in
order to make clearer the meaning of specific quotations.
1. Organs should be allocated using
medical criteria
Conditional/directed donation can disrupt the usual
processes of organ allocation. The scenarios therefore
prompted more general discussion of how organs ought
to be allocated. Participants across all categories gener-
ally felt that organs should preferably be donated uncon-
ditionally, primarily because this allows for allocation
according to medical criteria. Participant PD6 cast doubt
on the public’s ability to make good decisions in the
context of organ allocation. That this participant thought
that scientific data should be providing the basis for good
allocation decisions points to an assumption that medical
criteria are better because they are objective, not biased
by personal opinion:
They should leave that type of judgment for scientists
who have the data to back up those kinds of claims . . .
they should be guided by numbers and science . . . and
not opinion. People [the public] can’t be trusted to
make good decisions, I think we all know that – PD6
The view that medical criteria are more substantial than
opinion was shared by many participants across all
groups. Medical criteria were often regarded as facts that
produce an allocation process that avoids judgments
involving complex/controversial values.
Criteria such as ‘greatest need’, ‘likely transplant out-
comes’ or ‘best match’ were all regarded as ‘medical’:
I still think that the decision should be made medically
on perhaps who is less likely to reject it and who is
more . . . likely to come out of it successfully. – PD1
what’s their chances of survival, what’s the chances of
the graft surviving, as long as you know a reasonable
length of time and they’re then allocated onto the list in
that way – TS5
18 NHS Blood and Transplant. South Asian Campaign. [cited 2015 Feb
5] Available at: http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/campaigns/
other_campaigns/detail.asp?id=3.
19 J. Saldana. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. London:
SAGE Publications; 2013. 81.
Table 2. Outline demographics of participants
Acronym Number Gender Other Information
Transplant Staff TS 11 Not specified for staff,
because it is potentially
identifying information
2 × Consultants Anaesthetists/Intensivists
3 × Specialist Nurses – Organ Donation
2 × Liver Recipient Transplant Co-ordinators
2 × Liver Transplant Surgeons
1 × Liver Consultant Physician
1 × Clinical Nurse Specialist in Addiction Psychiatry
Potential Donors PD 20 13 female, 7 male 10 × South Asian ethnicity
10 × any other ethnicity
Potential Recipients PR 9 4 female, 5 male 4 × liver, 5 × kidney
Greg Moorlock, Jonathan Ives, Simon Bramhall, and Heather Draper4
© 2015 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Should We Reject Donated Organs on Moral Grounds? 285
VC 2015 The Authors. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
2. Justifications for using medical criteria
Objectivity
A reason frequently given for preferring medical criteria
was that they remove emotion from sensitive situations
and exclude individuals’ biases from allocation decisions.
PD2 illustrates the sometimes tacit assumption that it is
undesirable for organ allocation to be based upon the
views of someone emotionally involved in the situation:
Yes I do, I really do . . . you’ve gotta take emotion out
of the argument and I think that’s the only way to do it,
is try and get someone who hopefully has a more objec-
tive view than the family of the deceased. – PD2
Another potential donor pointed to the avoidance of bias
and suggests that the medical community should be
focussing on medical need rather than other (potentially
still relevant) criteria such as dessert:
I’m hoping the medical community will make them
without bias and on medical needs, somebody who
needs an organ in order to survive or a better quality of
life, rather than somebody’s more deserving – PD28
Consistency and fairness
All participants thought that allocating organs fairly was
important, and most felt that allocating according to
medical criteria was the best way to achieve this. For
example, one member of staff (TS4) favoured medical
criteria, and argued that their objectivity helped to justify
allocation decisions to others. This suggests that the cri-
teria contribute to robust and defensible allocation, so
that allocation is not just fair, but also seen to be fair:
as long as the principles on which you do the allocation
is transparent, and it’s objective, so that you can justify
why you give it to A or B or why C doesn’t get a chance
at getting the organ, I think that’s the best you can do
– TS4
The importance of organ allocation being fair and
transparent seemed to be emphasized because the stakes
are so high: sometimes literally life or death. There was a
feeling that when stakes are lower there might be room to
listen to individual preferences:
I think it’s mainly because of it’s that life and death
thing isn’t it? As opposed to just cash or whatever. Just
giving stuff away . . . you could give it to anybody
couldn’t you? Him on the street if you wanted. But
when it comes to a matter of life and death it’s a dif-
ferent issue. – PR2
Although fairness was important to all participants,
there were individual cases of disagreement over which
criteria were relevant to a fair decision. The most com-
monly held view was that only criteria related to out-
comes with or without a transplant are relevant:
Ok, to me fair would be based on like I say if you have
your waiting list, you have an organ come in, I think it
should all be based on effectively percentage chance of
. . . of survival’s the wrong word but being able to lead
a reasonable life afterwards. – PD9
Some participants considered whether fair allocation
should include why someone needs a transplant, which
could be construed as a departure from the usual medical
allocation criteria. Of these participants, many thought
that whilst a patient causing their own illness might make
them less deserving of a transplant, this should nonethe-
less be excluded from allocation decisions. The potential
donor below, who felt that deservingness should be con-
sidered, was in a small minority:
Fair is I don’t know what I’ve already mentioned, like
based on how the person and why the person requires
the organ in the first place. – PD7
There was also one participant who questioned the
meaning of ‘greatest need’. Most participants regarded
medical need as absolute and fact-based, but one member
of transplant staff doubted the objectiveness of this cri-
terion, and appreciated that need may be contingent
upon a number of factors, some of which may not be
medical:
Greatest need by whose definition, that’s my problem.
Who’s defined the greatest need, you know, what
because they’re hooked onto a hundred million life
support machines, you know what about the greatest
need of someone’s gonna be left without a husband, so
you know, once again it’s been by definition. What we
all interpret as greatest need is different for us all. – TS6
Best way to fulfil goal of transplantation
A view prominent across all groups was that organ allo-
cation should not be based on who is more worthy to live,
because the goal of transplantation should be simply to
restore health. It therefore followed that transplant staff
should not be considering factors beyond the ‘medical’
when allocating organs, as these considerations were
nothing to do with the goals of transplantation. This
participant summed up the view succinctly:
[treat] everybody as if they’re the same and . . . other
factors should just be completely ignored, all they’re
really there to do is to make people healthy regardless
of any of their history. – PD4
This view suggests that the purpose of transplantation
is to meet the medical needs of those who require trans-
plants, and nothing more. The following participant,
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although mentioning classes of people, again links this
back to the idea of transplantation meeting needs of
people requiring transplants:
I think it’s up to the medical staff to actually decide
who gets that organ. . . . Because I think they have a
better idea of who’s out there and which class of people
actually need a liver transplant – PD24
3. Acceptable deviation from medical criteria
Despite widespread support for medical criteria being the
best basis for allocation, there was some support for
limited types of conditional or directed donation. Several
participants felt that directed donation to family
members or close friends was acceptable. Some drew par-
allels to living donation where this is commonplace,
whereas others highlighted the fact that people display
levels of partiality for their loved ones in every-day life,
and that this is often considered acceptable:
I think that extends in to every . . . aspect of your life,
you know lots of things you do for family and loved
ones that you would never ever do for random people
and I don’t think that’s a bad thing on the whole. –
PD1
There was also some support in all groups for directed
donations to children. This was most often justified on
the grounds of children’s perceived vulnerability, or that
they have lived less life than adults:
Just because a child has I don’t know, they’ve arguably
probably got more of their life to lead, they have had
less of a life because they’re younger than you know
someone older and I don’t know I guess they’d be seen
as being more vulnerable, weaker, which is not neces-
sarily true, but they’ve just got more of their life to live,
haven’t they? – PD5
4. Unacceptable forms of
conditional donation
Although inclined to reject bypassing medical criteria for
allocation, many participants felt uneasy about the cost
of turning down potential donations. For these partici-
pants, saving lives carried more weight than strict adher-
ence to medical criteria:
at the end of the day it’s better to save some than to
throw a chance away that, you know I mean, people
could last another 10, 20 years with the treatment and
what you have . . . so it’s giving 5 to 6 people a chance
to live that little bit longer in life and probably enjoy
their lives – PR4
For many participants (mostly in the recipient and
donor groups), the consequence of saving additional lives
could justify the acceptance of conditions that would
otherwise be considered unacceptable, including the
racist conditions in the 1998 case:
Well the people who were you know judging this basi-
cally thought well you know, we’d rather that it went to
the people than we just flat out refused, so I think they
were probably in the right there. – PD7 (discussing the
1998 conditional donation)
Many participants thought that accepting conditions
should be a last resort, justified only if the alternative was
to turn down a donation, because refusing a donation is
a waste of a potentially life-saving resource:
I think that your default position should be on medical
needs and only if they are risking to lose organs, then
maybe as a kind of sub parameter, perhaps a back
door, we should allow the donor actually to voice con-
ditions or direct the donation. – TS10
5. Staff concerns about integrity of the
transplantation system
In contrast to some of the non-staff participants, many
(although not all) of the staff participants viewed turning
down conditional donations as unfortunate but necessary
in order to maintain the integrity of the transplantation
system:
Our society at the moment is prepared to pay the price
of losing the occasional organ in this situation because
of the, you know, the greater good and the overriding
principle really – TS3
6. Limitations
Although the study specifically attempted to ensure that
SA potential donors were well represented, no noticeable
differences were found between the views of SA potential
donors and donors of other ethnicities. Given the known
differences in attitudes towards organ donation20 from
this population and the general population, this was sur-
prising. The recruitment methods necessary to secure suf-
ficient participants within the time constraints of the
study will have led to a non-representative sample –
although it is worth noting that the aim of this kind of
empirical study is not to obtain representativeness, but to
explore personal accounts and generate ideas. Initial
recruitment attempts were made through an inner-
city General Practice, with invitation packs being sent
in the post to 100 SA potential donors. This yielded
no responses. As a secondary recruitment method, SA
20 F.S. Al Khawari, G. Stimson & A. Warrens. Attitudes Toward
Transplantation in UK Muslim Indo-Asians in West London. Am J
Transplant 2005; 5: 1326–1331.
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participants were recruited via a combination of Univer-
sity of Birmingham advertising in a weekly e-newsletter
and snowballing (asking colleagues, friends and existing
participants to pass on information about the research to
people who may be interested in participating). This
resulted in the SA sample containing participants who
were generally well educated, who had links to the
research community at the University, and were generally
pro-organ donation.
Transplant staff and potential recipients were mostly
from the Liver or Kidney Units, and different organs may
raise different issues. The heart, for instance, is often
noted for its symbolism21 and this may impact upon peo-
ple’s views. Further research with staff/patients relating
to other organs may therefore be beneficial.
DISCUSSION
Our data illustrate the dilemma that conditional and
directed donations pose: although the conditions them-
selves may be objectionable or require deviation from
preferred, national allocation criteria, an offered organ is
still a life-saving/life-improving resource, and refusing
this resource on ideological grounds has potentially lethal
consequences for those awaiting transplantation. The fol-
lowing discussion will therefore assess the robustness of
the ideological grounds espoused by participants, to
establish whether they provide compelling reasons to
exclude non-medical criteria and turn down conditional
or directed donations.
The privileged position of medical criteria
Participants’ views on the right way to allocate organs
significantly influenced how they viewed conditional and
directed donations. The preference for organs to be allo-
cated according to medical criteria broadly reflects how
organs are currently allocated, and our findings here are
in-line with other studies,22 where participants also
favoured adherence to medical criteria. This preference
meant that all conditional donations were regarded as
non-ideal. Presented with this view, it could be tempting
simply to reject conditional and directed donations as
contravening the principles of allocation important to
stakeholders. Further analysis, however, will highlight:
i) problems in how participants idealized medical cri-
teria, undermining the view that medical criteria
provide an objective and undisputable basis for
organ allocation.
ii) how participants’ justification for using medical cri-
teria can also support deviation from the same crite-
ria in specific circumstances
The differences between medical and
moral criteria
Medical criteria23 were considered to include greatest
need, urgency, best match and predicted transplant out-
comes, and there is some overlap between these criteria:
for instance, urgency may be related to many conceptions
of greatest need, and best tissue match is related to pre-
dicted outcomes. Criteria that were frequently rejected as
being non-medical included race,24 religion, or social
value/utility, but also those that are arguably medically-
related, such as disease type or cause of illness. The per-
ceived differences between these medical and non-
medical criteria are potentially complex. Merely making
reference to some aspect of a patient’s medical condition
did not render a criterion medical in the eyes of partici-
pants – otherwise, cause of illness would be considered
medical. Instead it seems that participants conceived of
medical criteria as being both health-focussed and
forward-looking, insofar as they play a role in answering
the question ‘what would happen to this patient’s health
if they did/did not receive these organs?’ This is a very
narrow view of what is relevant when allocating organs,
but reflected a view about the goals of transplantation,
which will be discussed in more detail later.
There was widespread belief that depending solely
upon medical criteria results in the right allocation of
organs, but the justification of this position was com-
monly grounded in the assumption that medical criteria
provide an unambiguously objective allocation process.
Veatch has already noted, however, that such criteria are
not objective, and that moral argument is required both
to define these criteria and determine how they ought to
be balanced against one another.25 For example, many
participants thought that organs ought to be allocated
according to greatest need, but did not recognize that
‘greatest need’ is a complex concept that involves balanc-
ing concerns such as urgency, current quality of life and
potential to benefit from a transplant. Even the superfi-
cially more simplistic criterion of ‘urgency’ requires con-
sideration of how the urgent risk of death should be
balanced against the urgent need to improve quality of
life.
21 M.L.A. Sadala & A.G.S. Noedir. Heart transplantation experiences:
a phenomenological approach. J Clin Nurs 2008; 17: 217–225.
22 A. Tong et al. Community Preferences for the Allocation of Solid
Organs for Transplantation: A Systematic Review. Transplantation
2010; 89: 796–805.
23 Although we argue that the distinction between medical and non-
medical criteria is not clear-cut, for simplicity’s sake we will use these
terms to discuss various criteria as this is how they were grouped by
participants.
24 It should be noted that sometimes race is medically relevant insofar
as it is linked to things that are medically relevant, such as HLA typing
to assess compatibility between donor and recipient.
25 Veatch, op. cit. note 11.
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Failing to recognize the complexity of these criteria
often resulted in participants assigning extra weight to
them and giving them an elevated status amongst other
possible criteria. Allocation based upon these medical
criteria is no more ‘matter of fact’ than allocation based
upon a person’s previous behaviour, their race or their
religious beliefs, so appealing to medical criteria as the
correct basis for organ allocation on the grounds of their
supposed objectivity is unconvincing. Furthermore, the
overt valuing of ‘objectivity’ is itself arguably subjective.
The assumption that organ allocation can be made
without subjectivity or the application of values is, there-
fore, deeply problematic.
Are medical criteria the only relevant criteria?
Although participants may be mistaken in thinking that
medical criteria are an especially privileged category of
allocation criteria, they did suggest other reasons to
maintain organ allocation based upon these criteria. For
instance, participants generally felt it important that
organ allocation should be just and fair, which in simple
terms requires that only differences that are relevant to
the situation in hand are considered when choosing one
patient over another. There was agreement from partici-
pants that some criteria are irrelevant to organ allocation
and are based upon flawed reasoning or prejudice. These
included criteria arbitrarily based upon religion or sexu-
ality (which, one presumes, will normally tend to lack
independent robust justification as the basis for alloca-
tion criteria – and as such are no more a suitable way of
differentiating between patients than considering what
their favourite television programme is). Basic principles
of justice and fairness provide strong arguments against
irrelevant criteria such as these being routinely used to
allocate organs.26 Participants also appeared, however,
to have a more restricted account of what is relevant to
organ allocation decisions (what we will refer to as ‘medi-
cally relevant’) than a more theoretical approach might
initially suggest (we will refer to this broader set of crite-
ria as being ‘morally relevant’). All things that are medi-
cally relevant are morally relevant, but not all morally
relevant considerations were thought to be medically
relevant.
The difference between medically and morally relevant
can be illustrated by considering the criterion of ‘pre-
dicted outcomes’, which could be defined as a primarily
medical criterion. A liver transplant might give one
patient a 90% probability of five year survival, or an
alternative patient a 10% probability. The answer to the
question of which has the best predicted outcome is
clearly the first patient. One may reasonably ask,
however, why five year survival is the relevant outcome.
If outcomes are important, then why define the relevant
outcome so narrowly? Outcomes could also include, for
instance, what the recipient is likely to do with their life
post-transplant. If one patient was expected to save many
lives, and the other expected to cause much suffering to
people, then, all other things being equal, there is a strong
moral argument in favour of choosing the former as this
would bring about the most good from the available
options. A less abstract example might be that the patient
with 90% chance of five year survival will live, but with a
relatively poor quality of life. In contrast, the patient with
a 10% chance of survival would live, if at all, with a very
good quality of life. It is not obvious that a good chance
of a poor quality is preferable to poor chance at a good
quality of life. Participants seemed to think, however,
that factors beyond the narrow medical conception of
outcomes are not appropriate considerations for organ
allocation (and so are not medically relevant), even
though they could be the sorts of considerations that are
morally relevant. There were two main ways in which
participants attempted to justify this position:
i) Donors/Transplant staff are poor judges, and any
judgments would not be sufficiently robust – there is
too much room for uncertainty in factors like social
value or quality of life and therefore such factors
increase risk of arbitrary injustice.
ii) Donors/Transplant staff ought not to judge – such
factors are irrelevant to the goals of transplantation
and medicine.
The first point is partly an empirical claim, but is intui-
tively reasonable. While medical staff are well-positioned
to assess a tissue type, current state of health and likely
future state of health, they are not generally uniquely well
positioned to establish, for example, how deserving a
patient may be, or where ultimate responsibility for their
illness lies. This uncertainty argument is not straight-
forward, however, because there is also significant uncer-
tainty in predicting even the narrowly defined (see earlier
discussion on predicted outcomes) medical outcomes of
transplantation, yet this is still considered to be an
acceptable means of choosing recipients. It may be that
the extent of uncertainty is greater when it comes to
non-medical criteria, but this will not always be the case,
so does not provide a strong reason to exclude wider
morally relevant considerations.
The second justification presents an interesting
problem: although many participants felt that other con-
siderations, such as responsibility for illness or social
worth may be morally relevant, they also felt that it
would be wrong for them to feature in the allocation
process. Some explanation is required of why morally
relevant considerations should be excluded.
26 Although justice provides reasons against these types of criteria, it is
important to note that other reasons may outweigh simple justice
concerns.
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Participants’ justification tended to employ the distinc-
tion between medical and moral criteria we have just
challenged. Specifically they thought that medical criteria
are robust and objectively defensible whereas moral cri-
teria are matters of opinion and open to disagreement.
This view is also endorsed by the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) in the US, who state
that: ‘in public policy related to allocation of organs there
is a widespread consensus that certain social aspects of
utility should not be taken into account’.27 OPTN’s jus-
tifications for this are that an individual’s social worth,
for instance, is a matter of opinion or a matter of good
fortune in the natural lottery,28 but this is unconvincing.29
The claim that these are matters of opinion draws on the
same false distinction between medical and non-medical
criteria employed by our participants. Although one may
have an opinion on someone’s social worth that is
grounded solely in unjustifiable prejudice, it is also pos-
sible for there to be defensible accounts of social worth
that are as objective as medical criteria. The latter point
about natural lotteries may be correct, but applies equally
to medical criteria (one patient may fortunately have
excellent expected outcomes, whereas another may
unfortunately have too many co-morbidities to be suffi-
ciently likely to survive, and this may be purely a result of
chance) so does not provide an absolute reason to exclude
non-medical but still morally relevant criteria. The views
of participants went slightly beyond the arguments
espoused by OPTN: they also centred on the idea that
transplantation services exist to meet the medical needs of
those who require transplants, and that wider considera-
tions are beyond the scope of transplantation goals.
The advantages of medical criteria
Although it has been argued that medical criteria do not
provide the objective basis for allocation that is often
assumed, and that the distinction between the medical
and the moral is not clear-cut, there remain reasons to
prefer medical criteria as the general basis for organ allo-
cation. Primarily, they allow for a balance of life-saving,
life-improving and equal treatment to be struck, which
allows the needs of transplant recipients (and society
more generally) to be met. For unconditional donations,
at least, this balance can be considered to be the optimal
outcome of organ allocation. This assumes, of course,
that the current UK allocation system is based on the best
empirical evidence and careful reasoning to ensure that
competing considerations are appropriately balanced.
This does not equate to a claim that the allocation system
is perfect. It may instead be the best currently available
attempt at balancing competing considerations in genu-
inely dilemmatic situations. If this is the case, then unnec-
essary deviation from current allocation policy would be
undesirable because deviation is unlikely to result in the
optimal outcomes, which would be a waste of the poten-
tial benefits provided by donated organs. This use of
potential benefits and avoidance of waste would therefore
provide a good prima facie reason to base organ alloca-
tion on primarily medical criteria as a general rule, but
does not itself provide a reason to rigidly exclude non-
medical criteria, especially if doing so might reduce waste
and improve outcomes in particular instances. Discussion
will now briefly consider reasons that were posited by
participants for deviating from strict adherence to
medical criteria.
Sometimes non-medical criteria can
be acceptable
Although participants generally regarded conditional
donations and their associated introduction of non-
medical criteria into allocation as non-ideal, there were
some specific conditions or directions that were consid-
ered by many to be acceptable deviations from medical
criteria. For instance, some participants thought it
acceptable to direct a donation to a family member or
towards (non-specified) children more generally. In a
survey by Neuberger and Mayer, 36% of respondents
supported directed donation to family members, and 59%
supported directed donations to children.30 Neither was
permissible following the DH’s 2000 report, although the
March 2010 revision now allows directed donation to
family members.
Participants’ views broadly accorded with current
guidance on requests for directed donation, although
participants tended to feel that these directions could be
more than just requests, so it would be permissible for the
donation to be contingent on the request being granted.
This is in line with living organ donation where donors in
qualifying relationships are able to specify that they only
want to donate their kidney or liver lobe if it is trans-
planted to a specific person.31 The DH report concluded
27 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Ethical Princi-
ples to be Considered in the Allocation of Human Organs. [cited 2015
Feb 5] Available from: http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/
bioethics.asp?index=10.
28 Ibid.
29 We take ‘natural lottery’ to refer to the Rawlsian idea of social and
natural lotteries, suggesting that there are some things that people are
born with, or into (e.g. economic situations), that are the result of
chance, so any advantage or disadvantage conferred to them through-
out life as a result of these things is, in one sense, undeserved. Someone
born into a wealthy family may be able to achieve greater social worth
than someone born into extreme poverty, for instance.
30 Neuberger & Mayer, op. cit. note 14.
31 In practice, living donors may be willing for their donated organ to be
transplanted to a stranger if, after it has been removed, it turns out not
to be suitable for the originally intended recipient. They are also given
the options of having the organ re-transplanted to themselves, for the
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that all conditional donations were unacceptable because
they violate the fundamental principles that organs must
be donated altruistically and allocated according to
greatest need; and it is unclear how a request for a
directed donation would not also violate these principles.
The March 2010 guidance appears to acknowledge that it
is acceptable for a donation to be allocated contrary to
greatest need (i.e. it can be directed to a family member,
who may not be the person in greatest need). However,
that guidance also states that ‘[c]onditionality offends
against the fundamental principle that organs are
donated voluntarily and freely and should go to patients
according to the agreed criteria’.32 This statement is con-
fusing; whether someone is freely and voluntarily decid-
ing to donate is entirely unrelated to that person placing
restrictions on who can receive their organs. Such restric-
tions can stop organs being allocated according to agreed
criteria, but then so could a (now acceptable) request for
a directed donation. It seems that the March 2010 guid-
ance represents an attempt to meet the needs/wishes of
the next-of-kin and the donor, whilst also allowing for the
need to save the lives of the most urgent recipients to be
met, but in doing so it has introduced further inconsist-
ency. The legal grounding of this guidance has been criti-
cized elsewhere,33 but the position it proposes also
appears to lack sufficient ethical justification. The needs
of the most urgent patients are allowed to trump the
known preferences of the next-of-kin/donor in deceased
donation, yet this is not true for living donation. It is not
obvious why the donor being dead is a relevant differ-
ence.34 This confusing situation could easily be resolved
by making requests for directed donation akin to living
donation, where the donation is understood to be contin-
gent on the request being granted.
Wasting Potential
Some conditions or directions were regarded by partici-
pants to be acceptable, such as those prioritizing family
members or children, although many also thought that
unconditional donation was preferable. Other conditions
were regarded as being irrelevant to organ allocation,
unjustifiable and plainly wrong; those, for instance,
involving race or sexuality. Despite this, many partici-
pants from all groups felt that even objectionable condi-
tional donations should be accepted if the alternative was
to refuse an organ that was life-saving/improving. Whilst
this view initially appears to be at odds with favouring
allocation based on medical criteria, an argument can,
and will now, be made for endorsing a general reliance on
medical criteria but also permitting exceptions.
Earlier discussion introduced the idea of meeting need,
and argued that a general allocation policy based upon
medical criteria will meet the needs of recipients relatively
effectively. Waste occurs when need is not met as fully as
it could be, and avoiding waste is important given the
organ shortage. A pertinent distinction can be drawn
between two types of waste: absolute and relative. Reject-
ing a conditional donation outright is an example of
absolute waste: a donation and all its potential benefit is
lost. Accepting a conditional donation, however, may
result in a form of relative waste, particularly if it sets a
precedent for future conditional donations.
Relative waste can be defined as the difference between
the maximum benefit that an available organ could
provide, and the actual benefit that it does provide. In the
UK, organs are not allocated solely to maximize benefit
to individual patients, but are instead allocated in order
to balance potentially competing considerations of utility
and justice, which helps to maximize benefit to society. It
is this overall benefit that should be considered here.
When organs are donated unconditionally, they can be
allocated according to the current criteria which allows
for the optimal overall benefit to be extracted from them.
A donation with conditions or directions attached
changes the choice landscape: the usual optimal benefit is
no longer available,35 so the choice becomes one of
obtaining sub-optimal benefit or no benefit. By allowing
conditions placed by donors to influence allocation,
however, additional criteria would enter the equation
which would likely compromise the overall benefit pro-
vided (compared with the same organs donated uncondi-
tionally). Conditional and directed donations therefore
have the potential to increase relative waste.
This presents a situation that requires careful balanc-
ing: accepting conditional or directed donations, as sug-
gested by many participants, can avoid the absolute
waste of turning away organs, but may result in increased
relative waste. Isolated instances of accepting conditional
or directed donations could reduce overall waste (as
organs would be accepted that otherwise would not be),
but the prospect of these donations becoming more wide-
spread (and the potential for donations that previously
would have been made unconditionally now being made
conditionally) could lead to increases in relative waste
outweighing any other gains. For instance, if an increased
number of conditional donations led to reduced public
support for the transplantation system, donation rates
organ to be donated for research, or for the organ to be disposed of. On
the other hand, living donors who do not have a specific recipient in
mind are not permitted to make any stipulations or conditions on their
donation.
32 NHS Blood and Transplant. op. cit. note 5.
33 Douglas & Cronin. op. cit. note 7.
34 And if it is a relevant difference, then it may raise interesting ques-
tions about whether the needs of the living can outweigh the wishes of
the dead in more cases.
35 We assume that it would be unacceptable to agree to the conditions
placed on a donation and then ignore them when allocating the organs.
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might subsequently drop, and the number of transplants
would therefore be reduced, thereby reducing overall
benefit.
This was something that many staff participants were
particularly wary of. They believed that organ donation
relies upon the goodwill of the public, and that this good-
will may require an allocation system that people can
trust. The potential donors who participated in this study
did not share these concerns, but larger-scale research
would clearly need to be conducted to establish the likely
impact upon donation rates. Minimizing waste will
increase the good that can be achieved by transplanta-
tion. It is important, however, that potentially competing
types of waste are balanced in a way that results in great-
est benefit. Achieving this balance is complicated, and
there are many uncertainties involved, but to turn down
all conditional donations is not obviously the correct
approach.
CONCLUSIONS
Given that participants thought that medical criteria
ought to generally be used to allocate organs, it follows
that conditional donations were viewed as non-ideal, but
the discussion of conditional donation has highlighted
several points of wider interest for organ allocation. It
has been argued, for instance, that participants’ views on
the nature of medical criteria were often mistaken, and do
not provide reasons to exclude all of the criteria that
participants viewed as non-medical. In addition, it has
been argued that participants held a narrow view of what
is medically relevant (and therefore considered relevant
for organ allocation), which often tended to exclude con-
siderations that could be considered morally relevant.
This led to the somewhat problematic position from par-
ticipants that somemorally relevant considerations ought
to be excluded from organ allocation.
Moreover, and specifically in relation to conditional
and directed donations, it has been argued that a con-
vincing justification for allocating organs primarily
according to medically relevant criteria – the avoidance
of waste – also provides a reason to consider other crite-
ria when the alternative is to turn down an offer of
organs. This then gives rise to a complex situation requir-
ing the balance of potentially competing forms of waste.
It would be wrong to conclude solely on the basis of the
findings and arguments presented in this article that con-
ditional donations ought to be accepted. Issues such as
maintaining public trust in the allocation system, involv-
ing publically funded organizations in discriminatory
practices, and the potential for furthering broader
healthcare inequalities are also important and have not
been considered here. But such issues must be considered
against the arguments put forward by our participants
and advanced in this paper (and others)36 that turning
down conditional donations may be wasting potentially
life-saving resources.
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